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1 INTRODUCTION 
It is well established that the predominant 
relationship between a bank and its customer is that 
of debtor and creditor, 1 not trustee and beneficiary. 
A bank is not normally trustee of its customers for 
the amount standing to their credit in their bank 
accounts. 
However, along with other "strangers" (ie to the 
trust or fiduciary relationship), a bank t hat 
interferes in a trust or fiduciary relationship2 may 
be treated as a constructive trustee merely as a 
way of obtaining equitable relief by way of personal 
liability to account as if it had been an express 
trustee. But the imposition of a constructive trust 
as a personal remedy is quite distinct from the 
proprietary trust of specific property. 
Where the trust property or its traceable product is 
still in the hands of the bank, the bank h o lds the 
propert y as trustee subject on the terms o f the 
original trust, unless it was a bona fide purchaser 
for value without notice of the original trust. 3 
This situation is covered by the law of priorities, 
assisted if necessary by tracing principles. However 
if the bank has parted with the trust property or 
its traceable product, it can only be held liable to 
account for the value of the property. 
lfbley v Hi u ( 1848) 2 HL cas 28. 
2'Ibe relationship need not be of a fornal kind. 
3o Hayton "Personal .Accountability of Strangers as 
Constructive Trustees" ( 1988) 27 Mal LR 313, 314. 
LAW LIBRARY 
Vl(>Tc;-,1A u;~IVEP.SITY (.,f \'/[L.Ut;'."'Tm, 
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The seminal statement of the liability of a stranger 
to a trust as constructive trustee appears in the 
judgment of Lord Selborne in Barnes v Addy.4 His 
Lordship stated that:5 
... strangers are not to be made 
constructive trustees merely 
because they act as the agents of 
trustees in transactions within 
their legal powers, transactions 
perhaps of which a Court of Equity 
may disapprove, unless 
those agents receive and become 
chargeable with some part of the 
trust property, or unless they 
assist with knowledge in a dishonest 
and fraudulent design on the part 
of the trustees. 
As a result of Lord Selborne's statement the two 
main categories of a stranger's liability as 
constructive trustee have been labelled "knowing 
receipt or dealing" and "knowing assistance". 
2 KNOWING ASSISTANCE 
2.1 Elements of Liability 
People who do not themselves receive trust property 
or who receive it only in their capacity as agents, 
may incur liability to the beneficiaries of the trust 
if they knowingly assist in a dishonest and fraudulent 
design on the part of the trustees. 6 The elements 
of this head of liability are:7 
(i) the existence of a trust or fiduciary 
relationship; 
4(1874) 9 Ch App 244. 
5 Above n4, 251. 
6Barnes v Addy ( 1874) 9 Ch App 244, 251. -- // / 
7Baden. Delvaux and Lectrit v Societe ~ pour Favoriser 
le Developperrent du Camerce et de L'I.rrlustrie en France SA 
(1983] BCI1.: 325,404. 
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(ii) the existence of a dishonest and fraudulent 
design on the part of the trustees; 
(iii) the assistance of the stranger8 in that 
design; and 
(iv) the knowledge of the stranger. 
2.2 Existence of a Trust 
It is clear from Baden Delvaux and Lecuit v Societe 
/ / l . l / Genera pour Favoriser e Developpement du Commerce 
et de l'Industrie en France S.A9 that the trust 
does not have to be in writing. It is sufficient 
if there is a fiduciary relationship. In Baden 
Delvaux directors who misapplied their company's 
assets were held to be in a fiduciary relationship 
with the company for the purposes of the "knowing 
assistance" head of liability. 
Several recent New Zealand cases have questioned the 
need for this element at all.lo In Elders Pastoral 
Ltd v Bank of New Zealand11 the Court of Appeal 
took the view that a fiduciary relationship is no 
longer a necessary prerequisite for a constructive 
trust. Cooke J held that a trust may be imposed 
whenever someone receives money or other property 
which consistently with good conscience cannot be 
retained. 12 
8 rn this context "stranger" rreans a third party to the 
trust, incluling a bank. 
9Above n7. 
l05ee Elders Pastoral v BNl (1989) 2 NZLR 180, 186; 
Ebwell V 'Il1ctlJ)son ( 1990-) -1 NZ ConvC 190,663, 669; 
and In re Goldoorp Refiners and G>ldoorp Exchange 
(1990) unrep, M1450/99 M1332/89, M1572/89, CP21/88 
(Orristchurch Registry), 109. 
11(1989] 2 NZLR 180. 
12Above nil, 186. 
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This decision heralded the emergence of the remedial 
constructive trust in New Zealand. Based on 
principles derived from de facto relationship cases, 
this type of constructive trust demands no special 
relationship between the parties. It is simply,13 
... a device for imposing 
a liability to account on 
persons who cannot in good 
conscience retain a benefit 
in breach of their legal or 
equitable obligations. 
The interesting question, following Elders Pastoral, 
is how far equitable concepts derived from family 
law can be extended into the commercial arena 
without impinging on well-established contractual 
principles. One such principle concerns the 
relationship between banker and customer. The 
threat of liability as a constructive trustee 
imp9ses an onerous burden on banks in dealings 
with their customers. Banks are now being forced to 
make probing enquiries about the origin of deposited 
funds. Such enquiries would not have even been 
considered ten years ago. 
2.3 Dishonest and Fraudulent Design 
In the context of the elements of "knowing assistance~ 
'dishonest' and 'fraudulent' have their ordinary 
meaning, as employed in the criminal law. 14 They go 
no further than mere moral reprehensibility. 1 5 
In Belmont Fiance Corporation Ltd v Williams 
Furniture Ltd, 1 6 the Court of Appeal held that 
there was no distinction between fraud and dishonesty 
13Elders, 193. 
145ee PJ Srrart '"!be Constructive Trust in the Law of 'lbeft" 
(1986] NLJ 913. 
15Ee.1nnnt Finance Corporation Ltd v WiJJiarm Furniture Ltd 
(1979] Ch 250, 267; Baden Delvaux ]1983] ICLC 325,407. 
16.Above nlS. 
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and that the words had identical meanings. It was 
important, in the Court's unanimous view, to preserve 
certainty. 
2.4 Assistance 
This word has not been fully defined in the cases 
although some partial definitions have appeared. 
In Baden Delvaux Gibson J stated that whether 
assistance has been given is a question of fact. He 
later gave an example of a bank giving assistance: 
if one banker transferred funds to another on the 
orders of directors of a company, in a situation 
where the directors were misapplying the assets of 
the company, the bank would have given the necessary 
assistance. This is similar to the view expressed 
by Lawson Jin International Sales and Agencies Ltd 
v Marcus, 17 that where 'funds disposed of in breach 
of constructive trust reach other quarters', then 
the necessary assistance would have been given. A 
bank will be held to have assisted a dishonest 
trustee if the bank helps the trustee to carry out 
the fraudulent design. However, the bank must play 
a proactive role such as transferring trust funds to 
a third party. 
2.5 Knowledge 
The scope and extent of the required knowledge has 
proved most controversial in "knowing assistance" 
cases. It is vital, in this respect, to distinguish 
between knowledge and notice. Notice here is a 
purely equitable concept, rooted in the equitable 
17]1982] 3 All ER 551. 
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jurisdiction against fraud. It was never adopted 
by the courts of common law, which preferred 
instead to develop their own concept of knowledge. 
Inevitably, there was some overlap between what 
equity regarded as notice and what the common law 
treated as knowledge. As Hayton points out, 1 8 the 
muddled case law in this area has partly arisen out 
of confusing these two concepts. 
2.6 The, Baden· Delvaux Categories 
In Baden Delvaux Peter Gibson J accepted the 
plaintiff's submission that knowledge for the 
purposes of constructive trusteeship can comprise 
one of five different mental states: 19 
( i) 
(ii) 
(iii) 
(iv) 
actual knowledge; 
wilfully shutting one's eyes to the 
obvious; 
wilfully and recklessly failing to make 
such enquiries as an honest and reasonable 
man would make; 
knowledge of circumstances which would 
indicate the facts to an honest and 
reasonable man; or 
(v) knowledge of facts which would put an 
honest and reasonable man on enquiry. 
l8n~ Stranger as Constructive Trustee" (1987] 46 CI.J 395. 
19:w 407-408 • 
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With respect, this complicated analysis of "knowledge" 
seems questionable. First, a "wilful shutting of 
eyes" under category (ii) is not a lesser degree of 
knowledge than actual knowledge, but evidence from 
which a court may infer actual knowledge. 2 0 "Wilful 
blindness" is the equivalent of actual knowledge in 
most cases because the court will impute actual 
knowledge on to the defendant. Secondly, categories 
(iii), (iv) and (v) do not by any ordinary meaning 
of the word constitute 'knowledge'. However, 
categories (iii) and (iv) are distinguishable from 
(v) because they at least involve a degree of sub-
jective awareness. 
The categories in Baden Delvaux begin with the 
adoption of a totally subjective test based on actual 
knowledge and end with a totally objective test based 
on a hypothetical honest and reasonable person. 
Categories (iv) and (v) derive from Selangor United 
Rubber Estates Ltd v Cradock (No 3).21 In that 
case Ungoed-Thomas J concluded that the knowledge 
required to hold a bank liable as a constructive 
trustee in a dishonest and fraudulent design was 
knowledge of circumstances which would indicate to 
an honest and reasonable man that such design was 
being put into effect or would put an honest and 
reasonable man on enquiry as to whether it was being 
put into effect. His Lordship did not distinguish 
between these two alternatives, regarding them both 
as constructive notice. 
It is submitted that category (iv) on the Baden 
Delvaux scale cannot be equated with constructive 
notice. 
20English 
[1892] 
[1893] 
21 [1968] 
A person who knows all the facts relevant 
& Scottish ~tile Invesbrent Carpany v Bnmton 
2 QB 700, 707: 'lb:lrpson v Clydesdale Bank Ltd 
AC 282, 291. 
2 All ER 1073. 
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to a given matter, but who fails to appreciate their 
factual or legal significance, cannot be said to 
have constructive notice because the doctrine of 
notice is "wholly founded on the assumption that a 
man does not know the facts." 22 Such a person is 
regarded as being subjectively more aware of the 
situation than someone who is deemed to know about 
it by virtue of constructive notice. 
The decision in Selangor was followed by Brightman 
in Karak Rubber Co Ltd V Burden ( No 2)23 and by 
John Mills QC sitting as Deputy Judge in Rowlandson 
V National Westminster Bank Ltd. 24 Karak concerned 
a takeover of the plaintiff company which involved 
the use of the plaintiff's own assets to buy out 
J 
shareholders. In a reference to the defendant bank's 
assistant branch manager, Brightman J said: "I am 
completely satisfied that he entertained no suspicion 
whatsoever of any impropriety at any relevant time." 25 
Nevertheless, the judge held that a reasonable 
banker would have been put on enquiry as to the 
propriety of the particular transaction. 
The decisions in these cases were harsh because of 
the complete good faith of the respective banks. 
There are several reasons why the court was able to 
consider that the banks had constructive notice when, 
in reality, they had honestly failed to draw the 
necessary inferences or make the necessary enquiries. 
First, in previous authorities knowledge and notice 
were treated as if interchangeable. 26 They ·are not 
so, since knowledge involves a degree of awareness 
22English & Scottish ~tile 
[1892] 2 QB 700, 707. 
23 [1972] 1 All ER 1210. 
24 [1978] 3 All ER 370. 
251'\bove n23, 1221 • 
26 
Invesbrent Crnpany v B:nmton 
See Backhouse v Charlton ( 1878) 8 Ch D 444, 449; 
Re Blundell (1888) 40 Ch D 370, 381-383. 
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and notice does not. 2 7 Secondly, in many cases 
judges have found no actual knowledge and then added 
in emphasis that there were no grounds for such 
knowledge. 28 This has led to the contention that 
the presence of grounds for knowledge is itself 
enough for the imposition of a constructive trust. 
Thirdly, judges have often refrained from findings 
of actual knowledge in circumstances where they might 
easily have made such a finding. 29 
For a long time these developments justified courts 
imposing constructive trusteeship on banks which had 
acted honestly on the instructions of their principals. 
Baden Delvaux brought the "knowing assistance" head 
of liability very close to the common law tort of 
negligence. 30 Bankers became liable if they should 
have realised that there was a fraud, and should have 
made enquiries but did not do so. Thankfully, from 
the banks' point of view, this trend has been reversed 
in recent times. 
2.7 The Scope of Knowledge Limited 
The Selangor line of authority has been severely 
criticised by academic commentators in recent years3 1 
and is open to a fundamental objection. In Barnes v 
Addy32 the stranger's liability as a constructive 
trustee depended upon his assistance with knowledge 
in a dishonest and fraudulent design on the part of 
the trustees. While it is clear that Lord Selborne 
did not intend the test of knowledge to be entirely 
27carl Zeiss Stiftung v Herbert Smith & Co (It> 2) [1969] 
1 Ch 276, 296, per Sachs I.J. 
28see Williams vWilJiarIB (1881) 17 Ch0437, 445; 'Ihcrf6onv 
Clydesdale BanJc Ltd [1893] N:. 282, 287. 
29 Bodenham V Hoskyns ( 1852) 21 I.JCh 864, 873; Shields V Bank 
of Ireland [1901] 1 IR 222, 229. 
30 NAClaytm "BanJcs which Knowingly Assist" [1989] 2 JIBL 70, 74 
3loHqrton 'Personal Accotmtability of Strangers as Constructive 
Tnstees" ( 19850 27 Mal LR 313, 318; C HarpLin "'Ihe Stranger as 
<orut:ructile Trustee" ( 1986) 102 I.QR 114, 154; P Birks 
"Misdirected Jonds; Restitution fran the Recipient" Lloyd's 
Mar & can IQ ~ug 1989) 296, 336. 
321\bove n6. 
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subjective, he was also insistent that a stranger 
should not be liable if he acted honestly and without 
fraud. As Harpum points out, 33 Lord Selborne must 
therefore have intended knowledge to mean actual 
knowledge or a wilful shutting of eyes, (categories 
(ii) and (iii) on the Baden Delvaux scale) but nothing 
else. The fraudulent design assisted and the 
stranger's knowledge of it must be integrally 
connected, so that the stranger is party or privy to 
the design. The stranger is liable because he is 
implicated in that fraud. Innocent failure to make 
what is subsequently held to be a proper enquiry, so 
leading to an innocent failure to know of dishonesty, 
can hardly make one a party or privy to such dis-
honesty. 
It is submitted, therefore, that strict constructive 
notice of a dishonest and fraudulent design is not 
sufficient to impose personal liability to account 
on a banker as constructive trustee. The banker 
must be privy to the trustees' wrongdoing through 
subjective awareness raher than objective notice. 
Since Selangor the English Court of Appeal has 
attempted to limit the scope of knowledge required 
for liability as a "knowing assistant". The Court 
has introduced a requ i rement of want of probity on 
t.he part of the stranger which cannot be derived 
from a state of mind which is negligent but honest. 34 
In Consul Development Property Ltd v DPC Estates 
Property Ltd35 an important role was given to the 
concept of conscience. Stephen J considered that 
33"'Ihe Stranger as Constructive Trustee" (1986) 102 WR 114, 147. 
34cari Zeiss Stiftung v Herbert Smith & Co (It> 2) [1969) 2 Cll 
276, 296 (Sachs I.J) and 301 (F.dnurrl Davies I.J); Belnont 
Finance Corporation Ltd v Wi]Jiarm Furniture Ltd [1979) 
Cll 250, 267 (Buckley I.J); Nihi.ll V Nihi.ll [1983) unrep, 
CA Transcript 276 (Civil Division). 
35(1975) 132 CLR 573. 
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only actual knowledge or deliberately failing to 
make enquiry so as not to discover fraud would be 
sufficient knowledge to give rise to liability. In 
his Honour's opinion, if any other type of knowledge 
was to count then liability would be imposed without 
the conscience of the defendant being in any way 
affected. 
Similarly, in Belmont Finance Corporation Ltd v 
Williams Furniture Ltd 36 Buckley LJ, with whom 
Orr LJ agreed said:37 
The knowledge of that design 
on the part of the parties sought 
to be made liable may be actual 
knowledge. If he wilfully shuts 
his eyes to dishonesty, or wilfully 
or recklessly fails to make such 
enquiries as an honest and 
reasonable man would make, he may 
be found to have involved himself 
in the fraudulent character of 
the design or at any rate be 
disentitled to rely on lack of 
actual knowledge of the design 
as a defence. But otherwise, as 
it seems to me, he should not be 
held to be affected by construc-
tive notice. 
This passage emphasises the need for a want of probity 
on the part of the stranger before liability will be 
imposed. The stranger's conscience can only be 
affected in this way if he becomes aware of the 
trustees' fraudulent design or deliberately ignores 
facts which would lead to such an awareness. 
In Lipkin Gorman v Karpnale 38 a bank was directly 
involved. Mr Cass, a compulsive gambler and a 
partner in the plaintiff firm of solicitors, 
36 [1979) Ch 250. 
37.Above n36, 267. 
38 [1987) 1 WLR 987 (High Court) and 
( Court of Aweal) . 
[1989) 1 WLR 1340 
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misappropriated monies from his firm's client 
account maintained at Lloyd's Bank. The monies 
were exchanged for gambling chips at the Playboy 
Club in London and were then gambled away by Mr 
Cass. Over two hundred thousand pounds were lost 
in this fashion. 
An employee of the bank, Mr. Fox, knew that Mr Cass 
was a compulsive gambler and this fact had been noted 
on the bank's personal memorandum cards for Mr Cass's 
account. That account was maintained at the same 
branch as the solicitor's account. However, no 
evidence was produced during the proceedings that 
Mr Fox knew the source of Mr Cass's gambling money. 
It was sought, inter alia, to fix Lloyd's Bank with 
a constructive trust for the monies lost by Mr Cass 
through his gambling. The basis of such a trust 
was alleged to be the facilitation of Mr Cass's 
theft from the firm's trust account. 
At first instance, Alliot J refused to follow 
Selangor and said that negligence or carelessness 
by a banker could not be equated with the dishonesty 
necessary to create a constructive trust. However, 
the bank was still held to be liable. According to 
His Lordship a number of incidents had occurred to 
make clear to the bank Mr Cass's gambling and the 
lies which he told to attempt to hide it. 
Consequently, Alliot J held that Mr Fox either 
deliberately or recklessly shut his eyes to the 
source of Mr Cass's funds. That was sufficient to 
render the bank liable as a ''knowing assistant". 
-13-
The Court of Appeal unanimously agreed that Alliot 
J had been wrong to hold the bank liable as 
constructive trustee. There was no evidence adduced 
that the bank or its employees acted dishonestly. 
Furthermore, all members of the Court held that the 
bank had not been negligent in breach of its mandate 
with the solicitors. This finding necessarily 
precluded the bank being liable as a "knowing assistant" 
because negligence is the lowest point on the scale 
of possible mental states required for liability as 
a constructive trustee. 
Despite reaching opposite findings on the facts, 
it is clear that Alliot J and the Court of Appeal 
agreed on the need for a want of probity in "knowing 
assistance" cases. May LJ in the Court of Appeal 
referred to Belmont Finance as being strong persuasive 
authority that nothing less than knowledge of an 
underlying dishonest design was sufficient to make 
a stranger a constructive trustee of the consequences 
of that design. 
Whether the decision in Lipkin Gorman affords any 
satisfaction to innocent banks which become 
inadvertently involved in the dishonest conduct of 
a fiduciary is debatable. Lloyd's Bank will have 
derived some satisfaction, but an appeal to the 
House of Lords is pending. In the writer's view, 
the House of Lords should reject the imposition of 
liability on the bank because it did not have the 
requisite degree of knowledge to be a "knowing 
assistant". Confirmation is needed from the House 
of Lords that some want of probity is essential to 
this head of liability. 
-14-
In one of the most recent cases, Agip (Africa) 
Ltd v Jackson, 39 Millett J emphasised that the 
true distinction in "knowing assistance" cases is 
between honesty and dishonesty. He stated,40 
There is no sense in requiring 
dishonesty on the part of the 
principal while accepting 
negligence as sufficient for his 
assistant. Dishonest furtherance 
of the dishonest scheme of another 
is an understandable basis for 
liability; negligent but honest 
failure to appreciate that someone 
else's scheme is dishonest is not. 
It is submitted that this distinction is correct. 
If people fail to recognize fraud because their 
own moral obtuseness prevents them from doing so, 
they cannot be said to have acted dishonestly. 
Dishonest conduct involves failing tD draw obvious 
inferences because they do not want to know the 
truth. 
2.8 The Future 
Constructive trusts are said to be imposed in 
equity in order to satisfy the demands of justice 
and good conscience. 41 Concepts of carelessness 
are less relevant to the demands of justice and 
good conscience than they are to determining whether 
liability attaches in tort or contract against a 
banker. As Harpum has noted, 4 2 under the Selangor 
39[1989] 3 WLR 1367 '!be decision of Millett J has recently 
been upheld on appeal. See '!be Financial Tines 18 Jan 1991. 
40Above n39, 1389. 
41snell's Principles of Equity (26ed 1966), 201. 
42Above n33, 152. 
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view the moral quality of a third party's action 
is not emphasised; instead attention is focused 
on the third party's failure to enquire or infer. 
This approach blurs the distinction between contract, 
tort and constructive trusts. If a banker has been 
negligent or careless then the law of tort and 
contract provide perfectly adequate remedies and 
there is no need to resort to equitable principles. 43 
It is suggested that Selangor is now of little 
persuasive authority on the subject of the bank as 
constructive trustee. Knowledge of types (iv) and 
(v) on the Baden Delvaux scale should no longer 
play a part in "knowing assistance" cases requiring 
a dishonest furtherance of fraud. The House of 
Lords now has the opportunity to resolve the debate 
once and for all in the appeal from Lipkin Gorman. 
3 KNOWING RECEIPT 
3.1 Categories of Liability 
People who receive property which is subject to a 
trust become constructive trustees if they fall 
within one of three heads, namely: 44 
(i) that they received the trust property with 
knowledge that it was trust property and 
that the transfer to them was in breach of 
trust; 
430 Petkovic "The Banker as Constructive TnJstee" [1989] 
2 JIBL 88, 91. 
44.Above n7. 
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(ii) that having received the trust property knowing 
it to be such, but without knowledge of a 
breach of trust because there was none, they 
subsequently deal with the property in a 
manner inconsistent with the trust: 45 or 
(iii) that although they received the trust property 
without knowledge of the trust, they were not 
bona fide purchasers for value without notice 
of the trust, and yet, after they had acquired 
knowledge of the trust they dealt with the 
property in a manner inconsistent with the 
trust. 
3.2 Distinction Between Knowing Receipt and 
Knowing Assistance 
The basic distinction between the two categories of 
constructive trust is that ''knowing receipt" 
requires the stranger to receive the trust property, 
whereas "knowing assistance" does not. The second 
category arises where the third party assists the 
trustees in committing a breach of trust. 
A more fundamental distinction is that in the 
"knowing receipt'' class of case the underlying 
basis of the defendant's liability is the unjust 
enrichment of the defendant at the expense of the 
plaintiff. The defendant gains the trust property; 
the plaintiff is deprived of it. In the "knowing 
assistance" type of case the basis of liability is 
the conduct of the defendant in participating in a 
breach of trust. It is the behaviour of the 
45Abave n7. 
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defendant which is regarded as unconscionable 
rather than the fact that the defendant gains a 
material advantage at the plaintiff's expense. 4 6 
Failure to appreciate this distinction has led to 
much confusion over the degree of knowledge a 
stranger must possess before being held liable as 
a constructive trustee. 
3.3 Knowledge Required for Knowing Receipt 
On Lord Selborne's formulation in Barnes v Addy 47 
there is no need for a dishonest design on the part 
of the trustees to establish liability under this 
head. It has been argued, however, that there is 
no relaxation of the need for a want of probity by 
the stranger as a condition of liability. Hayton 
submits that on principle and precedent no 
distinction should be made between an innocent 
volunteer and a purchaser who merely has constructive 
notice - they only become liable when they obtain 
actual, "Nelsonian" (category (ii) on the Baden 
Delvaux scale) or "naughty" (category (iii) on the 
Baden Delvaux scale) knowledge that the property 
they hold is trust property or is its traceable 
product. 
This view was taken in obiter dicta, by Sachs and 
Edmund-Davies LJJ in Carl Zeiss Stiftung v Herbert 
Smith & Co (No 2), 48 and the point was re-stated 
by Megarry V-C in Re Montagu's Settlement Trusts. 4 9 
Megarry V-C held that to impose upon a stranger the 
burden of personal liability to account as a 
4 6Powell v Thompson (1990) 
190,670. 
47Above n6. 
48[1969] 2 Ch 276. 
49[1987] Ch 264. 
1 NZ ConvC 190,663; 
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constructive trustee, the stranger's conscience must 
be sufficiently affected to justify the imposition 
of such liability. He stated that:50 
... the cold calculus of 
constructive and imputed notice 
does not seem an appropriate 
instrument for deciding whether 
a man's conscience is 
sufficiently affected for it to 
be right to bind him by the 
obligations of a constructive 
trustee. 
Megarry V-C thus rejected the view that constructive 
notice suffices for "knowing receipt" cases as 
propounded by Peter Gibson Jin Baden Delvaux. He 
restricted liability under this head to cases 
involving knowledge of types (i) to (iii) on the 
Baden Delvaux scale. 
With respect, His Honour has misinterpreted the 
basis for liability as a "knowing recipient". 
Whether or not the stranger's conscience has been 
affected is irrelevant to this category of liability. 
The stranger is made liable, not because he has 
acted in an unconscionable manner, but because he 
has been unjustly enriched at the plaintiff's 
expense. The fact that moral improbity cannot be 
shown in every case of "knowing receipt" is 
immaterial. What liability under this head purports 
to do is to recognize the vulnerability of 
beneficiaries and not to compound their problems by 
accepting low standards of care in strangers' 
dealings with their principals. 51 To achieve this 
aim, it is submitted that all five categories of 
so.Above n49, 273. 
SlJK Maxton "F.quity" [1990] NZ Ree LR 89, 94. 
-19-
knowledge on the Baden Delvaux scale ought to be 
sufficient to impose liability on a stranger as a 
"knowing recipient" . If the focus is on the unjust 
enrichment of the defendant, it should not matter 
whether that defendant had actual knowledge or just 
constructive notice of the breach of trust. 
This view is supported by several recent cases. In 
Belmont Finance Corporation Ltd v Williams Furniture 
Ltd (No 2) 52 Goff LJ stated that to receive trust 
funds in such a way as to become accountable for them 
did not depend on fraud or dishonesty. Similarly, 
in International Sales and Agencies Ltd v Marcus53 
Lawson J considered that a recipient of company funds 
transferred in breach of a director's fiduciary 
duties could be held liable to account upon actual 
knowledge or constructive notice of the breach. He 
found actual knowledge on the facts, although he 
considered it would have been sufficient if the 
ordinary reasonable person in the position of the 
defendant would have known of the breach. 
The basis of liability in "knowing receipt" and 
"knowing assistance" cases is quite different. There 
is no reason why the degree of knowledge required 
for liability should be the same and there is good 
reason why it should not.54 
52[1980) 
53 [1982) 
1 All ER 393. 
3 All ER 551. 
54~ v Jackson [1989) 3 WLR 1367. 
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4 THE LAW IN NEW ZEALAND 
4.1 Knowing Receipt 
Only a few cases in New Zealand have dealt with 
the personal liability of a stranger as constructive 
trustee under either the "knowing receipt" or 
"knowing assistance" headings. Most of the findings 
have been made by way of obiter dicta, leaving the 
legal position of third parties to a trust such as 
banks in a state of uncertainty. 
The main authority is the Court of Appeal's decision 
in Westpac Banking Coporation v Savin.SS The two 
plaintiffs, Savin and Boyle, had authorised a boatyard 
operator Aqua Marine to sell their boats on a 
commission basis. Aqua Marine sold the boats and 
then deposited the money received from the purchasers 
into its trading account at Westpac which was 
overdrawn. 
Neither vendor was paid. Several weeks after the 
sales Aqua Marine went into liquidation and there 
were no funds available to meet the claims of 
ordinary creditors. Savin and Boyle sued Aqua Marine 
and Westpac alleging breach of fiduciary duty and 
conversion. They also alleged breach of constructive 
trust by Westpac, which is the relevant claim for 
present purposes. 
The breach of fiduciary duty by Aqua Marine was 
established early on. It had no authority to blend 
the vendors' money with its own and apply the balance 
for its private or trading purposes. Less still 
could it pay the money into a bank account which was 
overdrawn. 
5 5(1985] 2 NZLR 41. 
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In the High Court, Holland J dealt with the claim 
against Westpac under the ''knowing assistance" 
head of liability. He found that by receiving the 
cheques and crediting them to Aqua Marine's 
overdraft, Westpac assisted the company with 
knowledge of a dishonest and fraudulent design on 
the part of the company. This finding was subject 
to a strong challenge by Westpac on appeal. 
The preliminary conclusion reached by Richardson J 
in the Court of Appeal was that a bank would not be 
permitted to profit through a misapplication by a 
customer of funds entrusted to the customer if it 
had notice of the breach of fiduciary duty. However, 
the vital question was what, if anything short of 
actual knowledge that the depositor was committing 
a breach of fiduciary duty, is sufficient to impose 
on the bank personal liability to account as a 
constructive trustee. 
Without explaining his reason for taking a different 
approach from Holland J, Richardson J dealt with the 
claim against Westpac under the ''knowing receipt" 
and not the ''knowing assistance" head. His Honour 
cited Baden Delvaux and then stated: 56 
As will shortly becom apparent, 
it is not necessary for the 
purpose of this case to express 
a final view as to the ambit of 
constructive knowledge in this 
class of case. In principle I 
cannot see any adequate 
justification for excluding 
categories (4) and (5) at least 
in the "knowing receipt" class 
of case and I tend to favour for 
that class of case the 
comprehensive approach adopted 
by Peter Gibson J which now has 
the endorsement of Halsbury. 
56 [1985] 2 NlLR 41. 
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His Honour was not required to express a final 
view as to the requisite degree of knowledge 
because he found that the actual knowledge of the 
bank was such that in receiving the cheques and 
applying them in reduction of the overdraft, it 
wilfully shut its eyes to the obvious (category 
(ii) knowledge) or, at least, wilfully and 
recklessly failed to satisfy itself that the 
receipts were not in respect of "on behalf" sales 
(category (iii) knowledge). Therefore, it was 
unnecessary to decide whether constructive notice 
sufficed for the "knowing receipt" head, although 
Reichardson J favoured its acceptance. 
While McMullin J was content to agree with Richardson 
Jon this point, Sir Clifford Richmond undertook a 
comprehensive review of the English cases dealing 
with the two heads of liability. In Sir Clifford 
Richmond's opinion, the law was correctly stated in 
Belmont Finance Corporation Ltd v Williams Furniture 
Ltd (No 2) 57 where the court held that actual 
knowledge or constructive notice is sufficient to 
impose liability on a stranger for ''knowing receipt". 
Therefore, agreeing with Richardson and McMullin JJ, 
His Honour concluded that Westpac be held liable to 
account to the plaintiffs as a constructive trustee. 
In Attorney-General for the United Kingdom v 
Wellington Newspapers Ltd 5 8 Davison CJ also followed 
Belmont Finance Corporation Ltd (No 2) in holding 
that constructive notice suffices for liability as 
a "knowing recipient". The same conclusion was 
reached by Tomkins Jin Marr & Anor v Arabco 
Traders Ltd & Ors.59 
57N:x:Jve n52. 
58 [1988] 1 
59(1987) 1 
NZLR 129. 
NZBLC 102, 732. 
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As the writer has already suggested, the acceptance 
of constructive notice for liability as a "knowing 
recipient" can be justified pursuant to the underlying 
basis of this head of constructive trust, namely the 
inequity of the defendant retaining the benefit of 
property received at the plaintiff's expense, rather 
than the conduct of the defendant. 
This point was emphasised by Thomas Jin Powell v 
Thompson. 60 His Honour stated that the danger of 
stipulating a test which was too high in the "knowing 
receipt" class of case is that a court of equity will 
be unable to intervene to assist an innocent plaintiff 
where, in the overall circumstances, it might consider 
such assistance justified. 61 He therefore considered 
that the knowledge required should be no greater than 
necessary to permit the court to examine the 
circumstances of the case with a view to deciding 
whether the defendant's retention of the trust 
property is inequitable. 
On that basis, Thomas J held that the five categories 
of knowledge on the Baden Delvaux scale apply to a 
person charged with being a "knowing recipient." 
His Honour would, however, have deleted reference 
to the word "honest" in the phrase "honest and 
reasonable person" because dishonesty is not a 
necessary ingredient if a constructive trust founded 
on unjust enrichment is in issue. 6 2 
Even though unjust enrichment and "property" are 
the foci of Thomas J's analysis, His Honour 
nevertheless did require some knowledge by the 
defendant before liability could be imposed. This 
60(1990) 1 NZConvC 190, 663. 
61 Above n60, 190,671. 
62 Above n60, 190,672. 
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view differs from Birks, who suggests that where 
an innocent recipient can be held to make restitution, 
there is a persuasive argument that liability should 
be strict. 6 3 Thomas J appears, in fact, to have 
recognised the attractiveness of such a position, as 
indicated in the following comment:64 
I would not preclude the 
possibility that in certain 
circumstances a court of equity 
could be persuaded to examine 
the equities of the competing 
claims where the defendant was 
not aware that he or she was 
receiving or dealing with the 
property in a way which was 
inconsistent with a trust. 
Because liability in this class 
of case stems from equity's 
unwillingness to accept the 
enrichment of the third party 
at the expense of the 
beneficiary, and not any 
particular conduct or 
misconduct on the part of 
either the trustee or the 
third party, such knowledge 
may not be necessary in order 
to activate equity's 
jurisdiction with the objective 
of ensuring a result which is 
consonant with good conscience. 
The difficulty with Birk's analysis is that it assumes 
that the recipient of a mistaken payment should be 
obliged to make restitution in every case. This 
undermines any consideration of whether the defendant 
has been unjustly enriched. If unjust enrichment is 
to be the focus in "knowing receipt" cases, the 
knowledge of the defendant will necessarily be one 
factor in determining whether the benefit gained 
is unjust. Furthermore, as Professor Rickett points 
out, 6 5 if strict liability is applicable to the 
63"Mi.sdirected Funds: Restitution frcm the Recipient" (1990) 
Lloyd's Mar & Can IQ 296. 
64Above n60, 671. 
65 11 Strangers as Constructive Trustees" ( 1991) 5 BCB 245, 247-
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"knowing receipt" case, what is the difference 
between this case and a simple case for equitable 
tracing? 
4.2 Knowing Receipt and Equitable Tracing 
Restitutionary rights and remedies can be personal 
or proprietary. A proprietary remedy recognizes 
that the plaintiff has some sort of ownership interest 
in an identifiable asset such that, with some 
exceptions, he or she can sue anyone else who controls 
it but who refuses to surrender it. A personal remedy, 
on the other hand, results not from ownership of an 
asset but from a breach of an obligation which the 
particular defendant owes the plaintiff. 6 6 
The difference is important because not only does it 
mean that plaintiffs who have proprietary remedies 
may have the ability to recover property for which 
they have a sentimental attachment, but also their 
rights to sue anyone controlling the asset will 
protect them from the insolvency of intervening 
possessors of the asset.67 
The imposition of constructive trusteeship as a 
personal remedy is quite distinct from the 
proprietary right of equitable tracing. However, 
despite the advantages proprietary remedies have 
over personal ones, the courts have often ignored 
tracing where it was clearly available on the facts, 
resorting instead to a constructive trust. In 
Westpac v Savin, 6 8 for example, Westpac used the 
66i<os arrl Watts "Unjust Enriclnent" NZIS Seminar, Feb 1990, 33. 
67N:x:Jve n66. 
68N:x:Jve n55. 
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money received to reduce Aqua Marine's overdraft, 
leaving it in an identifiable form. On that basis 
it is suggested that an equitable tracing claim 
would have succeeded against the bank. Although the 
common law has traditionally limited its proprietary 
rights to those relating to tangible assets other 
than money, courts of equity have allowed tracing 
claims in respect of money deposited in a bank account.69 
The possibility of tracing was not even considered 
in the Westpac case, all the argument being centred 
around the personal liability of constructive 
trusteeship. 
4.25 Deciding on the Appropriate Action 
In the writer's opinion, the imposition of 
constructive trusteeship on strangers as a formula 
for equitable relief is inappropriate where the 
strangers still have the trust property or its 
traceable product in their hands. This situation 
is better dealt with under the law of property and 
not under the law of personal remedies. The appropriate 
action is either a common law or equitable tracing 
claim. Common law tracing is merely an evidential 
requirement, used as a stepping stone to an action 
for money had and received, or conversion. Where 
common law tracing is not available on the facts, 
an equitable tracing claim should be pursued. The 
appropriate remedy in this situation will be an order 
for specific restitution. It does not come within 
the sphere of unjust enrichment at all, being a pure 
proprietary claim. 
69see Sinclair v BmuglHn [ 1914] P£. 398. 
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A personal remedy in the form of a constructive 
trust is only appropriate for restitution from a 
recipient against whom tracing has become impossible. 
It is submitted, however, that this class of case is 
better dealt with under the "knowing assistance" and 
not the "knowing receipt" head of liability. By 
dissipating the proceeds the recipient has assisted 
the fraud of the trustees and should be held 
personally liable to account if he had one of the 
first three types of knowledge on the Baden Delvaux 
scale. Selangor and Karak provide recent examples 
of banks being held liable within the "knowing 
assistance" category even though they received the 
trust property. 
Even in this second situation, the court is not 
necessarily considering a restitutionary proprietary 
claim, ie the imposition of a constructive trust. 
It is simply a question of translating the tracing 
claim into a personal claim. Whether or not that 
claim should be met by the grant of a restitutionary 
remedy will depend on whether or not the property 
remains identifiable. Only if it does not will the 
restitutionary issue arise and the stranger be held 
personally liable to account for the value of the 
property. The constructive trusteeship tag g i ven 
to the "knowing receipt" head of liability is 
regrettable. 70 
Given that the law of priorities and tracing are 
available to provide proprietary remedies against 
the recipient, the need for an additional head of 
recovery in the form of personal liability is surely 
questionable, even more so if strict liability is now 
applicable to the "knowing receipt" category. 
?OR Fardell & K Fulton "Constructive Trusts - A new 
era" [ 1991] NZLJ 90, 101. 
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Pursuant to this form of liability, a court will 
require any property transferred in breach of trust 
to be returned to its rightful owner, regardless of 
the knowledge of the defendant. In that case there 
is no need for the "knowing receipt" category at all. 
In the writer's opinion, the "knowing receipt" head 
of constructive trust should be abandoned. Courts 
should instead deal with claims using priority and 
tracing principles. Where tracing is not possible, 
personal liability should be based on the "knowing 
assistance" category. The result would be a 
significant improvement in the sense and clarity of 
the law. 
4.3 Knowing Assistance 
As yet, there has been no authoritative decision in 
New Zealand settling the degree of knowledge required 
under the "knowing assistance" head of liability. In 
Westpac v Savin 71 Sir Clifford Richmond expressed 
an obiter view; he did not find it necessary to give 
a final opinion as to the degree of knowledge 
required because he dealt with the case under the 
"knowing receipt" head of liability. However, he 
was strongly in favour of the view taken by the 
English Court of Appeal in Belmont Finance Corporation 
Ltd (No 1), 7 2 namely that some want of probity on 
the part of the stranger is essential. Tomkins J 
accepted this approach in Marr's case. He held that 
the plaintiffs would have to establish either actual, 
"Nelsonian", or "naughty" knowledge to make the 
defendant liable as a "knowing assistant". 
711\bove n55. 
721\bove n36. 
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In Powell v Thompson, 73 however, Thomas J could 
find no sound reason why the negligent conduct of a 
third party who assisted the trustee to commit a 
breach of trust should be put beyond the purview of 
unconscionable conduct which should attract the 
burden of trusteeship. 74 His Honour held that the 
issue under this head of liability is whether or not 
the third party's conduct is "unconscionable''. He 
concluded that:75 
... the requisite knowledge 
is not confined to actual 
knowledge but may include 
constructive knowledge. The 
third party's failure to make 
an enquiry notwithstanding 
that an enquiry might reasonably 
have been expected will form 
part of the defendant's overall 
conduct which will be examined 
by the court. Thus, where the 
third party facilitates a 
breach of trust without knowing 
of all the facts constituting 
the breach or knowing of the 
trustee's devious intention, 
the question will be whether, 
in all the circumstances, 
his or her conduct was 
unconscionable and justifies 
the imposition of the 
obligations of the trust upon 
them. 
Thomas J provided several reasons in support of this 
general unconscionability test. First, His Honour 
expressed a need to ensure that equity moves with 
the times. He observed that the Selangor case 
encouraged flexibility of approach. Although noting 
that recent English decisions had repeatedly upheld 
the dishonesty requirement, Thomas J went on to say 
that the New Zealand Court of Appeal had not endorsed 
73.Above n60 . 
74.Above n60, 190,675. 
75.Above n60, 190,674. 
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this approach.76 It was felt that Sir Clifford 
Richmond's opinion in the Westpac case was in the 
nature of obiter dicta and could even have been a 
reference to the situation where strangers receive 
trust property in their capacity as agents. 
Secondly, His Honour stated that the dishonesty 
requirement overlooks that equity is concerned to 
control unconscionable behaviour. In his view it 
did not matter whether the trustee's conduct was 
fraudulent or negligent. Once a breach of trust 
involving a third party has been committed, the 
issue which arises is between the beneficiary and 
that third party. If the third party's conduct has 
been unconscionable, then he or she is liable to 
account to the beneficiary, irrespective of the 
degree of improbity in the trustee's conduct. 77 
Finally, in Thomas J's view there is a difference 
between the approach to constructive trusts of the 
English courts on the one hand and of the New Zealand 
and Canadian courts on the other. The English courts 
see the constructive trust as a substantive institution 
and accordingly, it is available in relatively few 
situations. In contrast, His Honour stated that the 
constructive trust is viewed by New Zealand courts 
as a device for imposing liability to account and as 
a broad equitable remedy for reversing 
unconscionability.78 
With respect to Thomas J, his judgment on this point 
represents a departure from decided authority and can 
be challenged on several grounds. First, Sir Clifford 
76Above n60, 190,675. 
7 7Above n60, 190,767. 
78Above n60, 190,677-8. 
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Richmond's judgment in the Westpac case cannot be 
read in any way other than as an endorsement of the 
restricted knowledge approach to the "knowing 
assistance" head of liability. Although Sir 
Clifford's views on this matter were obiter dicta, 
they should be regarded as very persuasive. His 
Honour was not referring to agents when he supported 
the requirement of a want of probity. Furthermore, 
Thomas J's decision is in conflict with Tamkin J's 
earlier decision in Marr's case. 
Thomas J's second reason noted above is also in 
conflict with earlier authority. The reason seems 
to result from some confusion on Thomas J's part 
concerning the dishonesty requirement. The English 
authorities have always been clear that the threshhold 
for the application of the "knowing assistance" head 
of liability is a dishonest and fraudulent design on 
the part of the trustees. What has been in dispute 
is whether the same threshhold applies to the third 
party involved in the breach of trust. It must be 
remembered that it is not the trustees who are being 
made liable, but the person assisting the trustees. 
That person has not received any trust property. 
Consequently, the assistant will not have accepted 
any fiduciary responsibilities and any judgment will 
be met from personal resources, not from any benefits 
received. The dishonesty requirement adopted by the 
English courts reflects a desire to restrict liability 
for breaches of fiduciary duty to the fiduciaries 
themselves. 79 Those who do not have the means of 
controlling a fiduciary's behaviour should only be 
liable in limited circumstances, namely where they 
have acted dishonestly. 
79Above n70, 102. 
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In terms of policy, there is a persuasive argument 
that the dishonesty requirement is the only practical 
option for "knowing assistance" cases. The 
inevitable result of Powell will be to place a 
higher standard of enquiry on institutions such as 
banks. How the funds have been generated will be a 
familiar question between bankers and their clients. 
This is unacceptable. 
5 THE CONTRACTUAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN BANKER 
AND CUSTOMER 
5.1 The Bank's Conflicting Duties 
A bank is not normally trustee of its customers of 
the amount standing to their credit in their bank 
accounts. The predominant relationship is that of 
debtor and creditor. 80 It is important, therefore, 
to determine what effect this contractual relationship 
has on the imposition of a constructive trust on the 
bank. 
In Lipkin Gorman v Karpnale 81 Alliot J accepted 
five propositions on behalf of Lloyd's Bank which 
dealt with this question:82 
(i) The bank is entitled to treat the customer's 
mandate at its face value except in extreme 
cases. 
80Foley v Hill (1848) 2 HL cas 28 Recently reaffinred in 
Tai Hing mtton Mill Ltd v Liu Coong Hing Bank Ltd (1985] 
2 All ER 947. 
81[1987] 1 WLR 987. 
82Above n81, 1006 
(ii) 
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The bank is not obliged to question any 
transaction which is in accordance with the 
mandate unless a reasonable banker would 
have grounds for believing that the authorized 
signatories are misusing their authority for 
the purpose of defrauding their principals 
or otherwise defeating their true intention. 
(iii) Accordingly, if a bank does not have reasonable 
grounds for believing there is a fraud, it 
(iv) 
must pay. 
In assessing this, 'mere suspicion or unease' 
does not constitute reasonable grounds and 
is not enough to justify a bank in ignoring 
its customer's mandate. 
(v) It follows that the bank is not obliged "to 
act as an amateur detective." 
Paget's Law of Banking points out83 the ambivalent 
nature of bankers' duties when they know that the 
account is a trust account. They have to consider 
the interests of the persons beneficially entitled 
and they have to recognize the right of the customer 
to draw cheques on the account and have them honoured. 
This dual duty necessarily makes the task of bankers 
difficult. On the one hand, if they fail to honour 
the customer's mandate, they may render themselves 
liable for breach of contract; on the other, if they 
follow an instruction tainted by fraud, they may be 
liable as a constructive trustee. 84 It has been 
rightly suggested,85 therefore, that the English 
83(1982,9thed)69. 
84ww Aitken "Bank's Liability as Constructive Tiustee" 
[1989] 3 BLB 62, 63. 
85Petkovic, Above n43. 
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Court of Appeal's decision to limit the degree of 
knowledge required for liability under the "knowing 
assistance" head accords with commercial reality. 
To impose a duty to enquire does not accord well 
with the requirement that bankers perform banking 
transactions promptly. If performing routine banking 
functions could constitute "knowing assistance" in 
cases where a banker acts honestly, merely because 
the banker is in possession of facts which would 
lead an honest and reasonable person to infer a 
breach of trust or put such a person on enquiry of 
a breach of trust, the performance of the contract 
between banker and customer would be unjustifiably 
disrupted. 86 
5.2 Protecting Banks from Liability 
A recent case in which a bank successfully argued 
that it was entitled to refuse its customer's 
instructions is Manus Asia Company Inc. v Standard 
Chartered Bank.8 7 The defendant, Standard Chartered 
Bank, refused to transfer monies to the plaintiff 
customer. The customer was a company controlled 
by a person called Lee. Lee had been involved in 
certain activities in the United States which were 
under investigation by the Federal authorities as 
being "insider dealing". Profits from these 
activities were placed into the hands of the defendant 
bank. Subsequently, the customer asked for the 
monies to be transferred into the Hong Kong branch 
of that bank. The defendant bank refused so the 
customer brought proceedings against it for breach 
of contract. 
86 Above n85. 
87 ( 1988) Hong Kong Current Law, K7. 
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It is well established as a result of the decision 
in Libyan Arab Foreign Bank v Bankers Trust Company88 
that the customer has the fundamental right to demand 
payment in cash of the amount standing to the credit 
of the customer's account. The case provides one 
possible defence for a bank which refuses to comply 
with its customer's instructions, namely that payment 
to the customer would render the bank liable as a 
constructive trustee to a third party. 
Standard Chartered Bank had actual knowledge of 
Lee's dishonest and fraudulent scheme which was in 
breach of United States law. It was for this reason 
that it had placed the monies in its own foreign 
account. Therefore, if the bank had transferred 
the funds to the plaintiff company it would have 
been personally liable to account for the value of 
the funds as constructive trustee. As a result, 
the Court held that the bank had not breached its 
contract with the company. 
The decision in this case provides some relief, at 
least, for banks caught between their contractual 
duties to customers and their responsibility to 
third party beneficiaries. However, to decide not 
to honour otherwise proper instructions because of 
a suspicion that fraud is occurring imposes an 
onerous duty on a bank in relation to potential breach 
of contract, breach of confidence, and defamation. 
88[1989) 3 All ER 252. 
-35-
6 THE REMEDIAL CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST 
6.1 What is a Remedial Constructive Trust? 
The remedial constructive trust was developed in 
Canada over a decade ago. It was introduced to 
remedy situations of unjust enrichment in de facto 
relationship cases, 89 but has recently been extended 
into the commercial arena.90 
A plaintiff who requests a remedial constructive 
trust seeks a declaration that he has a beneficial 
interest in specific property owned by, or in the 
possession of, a defendant who has been unjustly 
enriched by that ownership or possession. If 
successful, the relief that the plaintiff obtains 
is proprietary in the sense that it gives the 
successful plaintiff rights in the specific property 
which are good not only against the defendant, but 
also against the general creditors of the defendant.9 1 
It must be emphasised that this form of constructive 
trust is remedial in nature. If the court is asked 
to grant such a remedy and determines that a 
declaration of constructive trust is warranted, 
then the proprietary interest awarded will be deemed 
to have arisen at the time when the unjust 
enrichment first occurred. 9 2 
Despite being described as a "broad and flexible 
equitable tool",93 the remedial constructive trust 
8~vMurdoch (1973) 41 DLR (3d) 367. 
90Atlas cabinets & Furniture Ltd v National Trust Co Ltd (1988) 
50 DLR (4th) 159 (Suprerre Court) and (1990) 68 DLR (4th) 161 
( Court of Appeal) • 
91m Paciocco "'Ibe R€!1Edial Constructive Trust: A Principled 
Basis for Priorities over Creditors" (1989) 68 Can Bar Rev 315. 
92Rawluk v Rawluk (1990) 65 DLR (4th) 161, 177. 
93Pettkus v Becker (1980) 117 DLR (3d) 257, 270 
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has developed on a principled basis. Before a 
court considers whether to award this remedy it 
must make a finding that there has been an unjust 
enrichment according to the formula adopted by the 
majority in Pettkus v Becker.94 This requires the 
court to find that there has been: 
(i) an enrichment of the defendant; 
(ii) a corresponding deprivation experienced by 
the plaintiff; and 
(iii) the absence of any juristic reason for the 
enrichment. 
As Paciocco points out,95 this principled basis is 
important because the remedy confers a beneficial 
interest in the property which is made the subject 
matter of the trust. This has the effect of giving 
the plaintiff the status of a secured creditor with 
respect to the constructive trust property. This 
status is not warranted in every case of unjust 
enrichment.96 
The remedial constructive trust differs from the 
traditional English concept in several respects. 
The first is its foundation in the concept of unjust 
enrichment. As Professor Waters puts it: 97 
94Above n93, 273-274. 
95Above n91, 318. 
96For a discussion of the implications of the renEdial 
constructive trust on insolvency, see DM Paciocco 
•'Ihe Renelial Constructive Tiust: A Principled Basis for 
Priorities over Creditors" (1989) 68 Can Bar Rev 315, 
321-325. 
97r.aw of Tiusts in Canada (2ed,1984)385. 
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... though the constructive 
trust remains in common law 
Canada a collection of 
liability situations, it now 
has a theme. The constructive 
trust in the area of spousal, 
or quasi-spousal property 
'arises ... out of inequitable 
withholding resulting in an 
unjust enrichment', and this 
is the theme, the basis of the 
defendant's liability. 
In contrast to the "knowing assistance" head of 
liability, the conduct of the defendant is only 
relevant to the remedial constructive trust in 
determining whether the enrichment is unjust. Even 
where a defendant is innocent, there may be no 
reason why that defendant should enjoy the increase 
in the value of property to which the plaintiff has 
a compelling restitutionary claim.98 Furthermore, 
the unconscionability or otherwise of the defendant's 
conduct has no bearing on the justification for 
awarding the plaintiff priority over the general 
creditors of the defendant. 
The second main difference between the traditional 
English concept of constructive trust and the 
doctrine now accepted in Canada is the proprietary 
nature of the Canadian doctrine. The remedial 
constructive trust confers a beneficial interest on 
the plaintiff with respect to the property held by 
the defendant. This can be distinguished from the 
"knowing assistance" and "knowing receipt" heads of 
liability, which are merely personal remedies and 
hold the defendant liable to account for the value 
of the trust property. 
98Above n91,348. 
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6.2 Equitable Tracing: Its Relationship to the 
Remedial Constructive Trust 
Like the remedial constructive trust, equitable 
tracing provides the plaintiff with the specific 
recovery of property. The remedy of tracing has 
traditionally only been available where the plaintiff 
holds a beneficial interest in the property and where 
the property remains in the defendant's hands. The 
prerequisite of a beneficial interest has two aspects. 
First, it means that the plaintiff must have a 
proprietary interest in the property. Secondly, 
that proprietary interest must be equitable. Each 
of these aspects is satisfied where the property is 
held on behalf of the plaintiff by someone who stood 
in a fiduciary relationship to the plaintiff. 
Both of these requirements are inappropriate for 
consideration as guiding principles in the context 
of the remedial constructive trust. Given that the 
formula for identifying unjust enrichment is intended 
to identify restitutionary proprietary claims, the 
requirement of a "pure" proprietary interest in the 
beneficiary is irrelevant to the imposition of a 
remedial constructive trust. Even though the 
proprietary interest awarded is deemed to have arisen 
at the time when the unjust enrichment first occurred, 
in reality it comes into existence as a result of 
the imposition of the trust.99 
As a result of the decision in Pettkus v Becker,100 
the fiduciary requirement is also no longer necessary 
for a remedial constructive trust. The importance 
99Above n91, 330. 
lOOAbove n93. 
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of this case was emphasised in Hunter Engineering 
Company v Syncrude Canada LtdlOl where Dickson CJC 
stated: 102 
The constructive trust has 
existed for over two hundred 
years as an equitable remedy 
for certain forms of unjust 
enrichment ... Until the 
decision of this court in 
Pettkus v Becker, the 
constructive trust was viewed 
largely in terms of the law 
of trusts, hence the need for 
the existence of a fiduciary 
relationship. In Pettkus v 
Becker, the court moved to an 
approach more in line with 
restitutionary principles by 
explicitly recognizing 
constructive trust as one of 
the remedies for unjust 
enrichment. 
It is clear, therefore, that the remedial 
constructive trust is quite different from the 
doctrine of equitable tracing. The two main 
requirements for tracing - a "pure'' proprietary 
interest in the plaintiff and a fiduciary 
relationship - are not prerequisites for the 
imposition of a remedial constructive trust. 
6.3 The Commercial Setting 
It is one thing to apply the 
remedy of constructive trust 
or analogous remedies to 
relationships such as husband 
and wife where, in common 
human experience, the parties 
101(1989) 57 DLR (4th) 321. 
l02.Above nlOl. 348-349. 
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rely at the outset on affection 
as a guarantee of reward and 
quite another to apply such 
remedies to relationships which, 
in the reasonable expectations 
of their participants, are 
governed by bargains clearly 
made with the intention of 
creating legal obligations on 
both sides.103 
This passage represents the traditional view of the 
judiciary, which has regarded unfavourably the 
intrustion of equity into commercial relationships. 
Even today, many judges are reluctant to impose 
equitable obligations on commercial representatives 
because of what they see as the need for certainty 
in commercial transactions.10 4 
One particular criticism made of the application of 
equitable doctrine in commercial transactions is that 
equity tends to view the case essentially as a problem 
between the immediate parties to the particular 
transaction and that, on occasions, insufficient 
attention is paid to the more remote consequences of 
a decision.105 
This criticism is very applicable to the situation 
where a constructive trust is imposed on an 
institution such as a bank. In most cases the court 
will not be assisted in its determination by a 
"commercial impact statement" which sets out the 
potential ramifications of imposing a duty to enquire 
on bankers. As the writer pointed out earlier,
106 
103Atlas cabinets & Furniture Ltd v National Trust Co Ltd 
(1990) 68 DLR (4th} 161, 196 (per Southin JA, dissenting 
in part}. 
1045ee eg Scandinavian Trading Tanker Co AB v Flota 
Petrolera F..cuatoriana (1983) QB 529, 540-541. 
l05See eg Hewett v Court (1983) 149 CLR 639, 651. 
106Above, para 5.1. 
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such a duty is of serious concern to banks. However, 
this concern was recognised in the Westpac case. 
Richardson J said:107 
Clearly Courts would not readily 
import a duty to inquire in the 
case of commercial transactions 
where they must be conscious of 
the seriously inhibiting effects 
of a wide application of the 
doctrine. Nevertheless there 
must be cases where there is no 
justification on the known facts 
for allowing a commercial man 
who has received funds paid to 
him in breach of trust to plead 
the shelter of the exigencies 
of commercial life. 
Although the remedial constructive trust developed 
in the family law context, it has recently been 
applied in a commercial setting. In Atlas Cabinets 
& Furniture Ltd v National Trust Company Ltdl08 
the plaintiffs were contractors on a condominium 
project which was financed by the defendant trust 
company. When the owner ran into financial 
difficulties, the contractors became concerned and 
threatened to reduce their work-force. However, the 
defendant's mortgage manager assured them that the 
defendant would continue to make advances and that 
it was retaining a hold-back. On the strength of 
those representations, the plaintiffs completed the 
project. However, when the contractors were not 
paid by the owner, the defendant claimed that it 
retained the money solely for its own security. 
The plaintiffs claimed the balance in the hold-back. 
107.Al:xJve n55, 53. 
108.Al:xJve n90. 
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The majority in both the British Columbia Supreme 
Court and Court of Appeal held that a remedial 
constructive trust could be imposed on the defendant. 
In the circumstances, the defendant was enriched 
because the project was completed, and the plaintiffs 
were deprived in that they extended further money to 
the project. Finally, there was no justification 
for the enrichment. 
In the Court of Appeal, Lambert JA expressly 
recognised the need to distinguish between domestic 
and commercial relationships. His Honour stated that 
in a domestic relationship, equality of parties 
should normally be the standard of fairness, but 
that in a business relationship, honest dealing and 
not equal dealing should set the standard of fairnessl09 
In Lambert JA's opinion, the concept of the injustice 
of the enrichment as being against sound commercial 
conscience should guide the application of the three 
tests in Pettkus v Becker when they are applied to 
a commercial relationship.110 
As Paciocco points out, 11 1 courts should be much 
more inclined to order specific relief in the 
context of spousal disputes, and must less inclined 
to do so in commercial cases. There are compelling 
reasons for this distinction. In the spousal context, 
the parties enter into a social partnership where 
there are expectations that both life and life-style 
will be shared. Relationships are ordinarily based 
upon a personal committment that is initially 
intended by the parties to be permanent. As a result, 
spousal relationships are typically established 
109(1990) 68 DLR (4th) 161, 171. 
llOAbove nl09, 172. 
lllAbcJve n91, 325-326. 
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and maintained with little formality, and little 
real negotiation about how property is to be divided 
in the event of dissolution. The fair treatment of 
the parties to such relationships has broad social 
policy implications which go beyond the usual 
commercial considerations.ll2 
In the commercial context, however, parties are 
expected to protect their interests contractually. 
If there are partnership or acquisition of title 
expectations it is anticipated that these will be 
provided for specifically. Moreover, plaintiffs 
must overcome the traditional protection of third 
parties from undisclosed charges, as evidenced by 
the bona fide purchser for value without notice rule. 
Reasonable investigation is less likely to reveal 
an unjust enrichment arising in the commercial sphere 
than in the domestic sphere.ll3 
It follows that whereas there are strong reasons for 
the ready invocation of the remedial constructive 
trust in cases of the unjust enrichment of a spouse, 
competing considerations counsel caution in the 
commercial context. 
6.4 The Remedial Constructive Trust in New Zealand 
In Elders Pastoral v Bank of New Zealand114 the 
New Zealand Court of AppeaJ indicated that the 
constructive trust can be used as a general remedy 
for imposing liability to account on persons who 
cannot in good conscience retain a benefit in breach 
of their legal or equitable obligations. 
112Above n91, 327. 
113Above n91, 327-328 . 
114[1989] 2 NZLR 180. 
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In that case the BNZ loaned, to a Mr Gunn, money 
secured over his stock by an instrument by way of 
security registered under the Chattels Transfer Act 
1924. Implied into the instrument was a clause to 
the effect that Mr Gunn would not, without the 
written consent of the bank, sell any part of the 
stock except in the ordinary course of business. 
Clause 15 of the instrument further provided that, 
in the absence of any direction to the contrary by 
the bank, all money payable in respect of the sale 
of stock should be paid to the bank. 
Mr Gunn's stock agents, Elders Pastoral Ltd, sold 
some of the stock secured and retained most of the 
proceeds of sale for itself in satisfaction of a 
debt owed to it by Mr Gunn. Only a small balance 
remaining was paid to the bank. The bank sued Elders 
to recover the full amount. Elders maintained that 
clause 15 had only contractual force between Mr Gunn 
and the bank, and did not give the bank an interest 
in the proceeds of sale, nor any right to trace the 
proceeds against a party in the particular position 
of Elders. 
The Court of Appeal accepted that Elders was taking 
a stand on what it believed to be its legal rights. 
Its good faith was not in question during the 
proceedings (ie there was no want of probity on 
its part). Nevertheless, the Court held that, on 
any objective test, Elders had a less than 
conscionable claim to retain the money. 
Cooke P concluded that reasonable persons in the 
shoes of all three parties would naturally have 
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thought that Elders must have held the net proceeds 
for the bank to the extent of Mr Gunn's indebtedness 
to the bank, unless the bank directed or agreed 
otherwise. He stated:115 
As a matter of fair commercial 
dealing one can hardly imagine 
any reasonable party in any of 
the three positions, on giving 
thought to their relationship, 
having any doubt about the duty. 
Therefore, it seemed to His Honour to be a clear 
case for imposing a constructive trust. In short, 
His Honour did not think that in good conscience 
Elders could retain the money. 
The most important aspect of this case is that the 
Court of Appeal was prepared to impose a constructive 
trust without finding that a fiduciary relationship 
existed between the Bank of New Zealand and Mr Gunn. 
Both Cooke P and Somers J found that all that was 
needed was for the plaintiff to show that it would 
be ''against good conscience" for the defendant to 
retain the asset in the face of the plaintiff's 
claim. Somers J had in fact already found that there 
was an obligation "fiduciary in character"ll6 between 
the parties imposing a duty to account for the 
proceeds of sale. 
However, it is unclear in the case whether the 
removal of the fiduciary requirement relates to the 
constructive trust, equitable tracing, or both. At 
one point in His Honour's judgment, Somers J referred 
to constructive trusts and equitable tracing 
115.Above n114, 186. 
116.Above nll4, 192. 
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when discussing the need for a fiduciary relationship. 11 ~ 
This confusion has been compounded in decisions 
following Elders. In Mogal Corporation Ltd v 
Australasia Investment Company Ltdl18 Smellie J 
considered that in Elders the Court of Appeal took 
the view that a fiduciary relationship is no longer 
a necessary prerequisite for a constructive trust. 1 19 
But in Re Goldcorp Exchange Ltd (in rec) and 
Goldcorp Refiners Ltd (in rec) 1 20 Thorp J concluded 
that despite recent authorities holding that a 
fiduciary relationship is a condition precedent to 
obtaining an equitable proprietary right of tracing, 
Elders had settled the law for New Zealand the other 
way.121 
As the writer pointed out earlier,122 the imposition 
of constructive trusteeship as a personal remedy is 
quite distinct from the proprietary right of 
equitable tracing. The imposition of constructive 
trusteeship on a third party is inappropriate where 
the third party still has the trust property or its 
traceable product in its hands. As Elders still 
retained the proceeds from the sale of the stock, 
the appropriate action was a tracing claim. However, 
while mentioning tracing, the Court of Appeal 
appeared also to impose a personal obligation on 
Elders to account for the proceeds of sale to the 
BNZ as constructive trustee. 
117Above n114, 193. 
118(1990) unrep,CL70/87 Auckland. 
ll9Above nll8, 64. 
120(1990) unrep, M1450/88, M1332/89, M1572/89, CP21/88 
Auckland; CP498/89 Christchurch. 
121Above nl20, 109. 
122Above, para 4.2. 
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The "good conscience'' constructive trust developed 
by the Court of Appeal in Elders has several 
features similar to Canada's remedial constructive 
trust. First, it appears to be based on unjust 
enrichment principles. The Court's focus in Elders 
was on the fact that the defendant had received a 
benefit to which it was not entitled, consequently 
depriving the plaintiff of that benefit. Secondly, 
the Court's finding that the defendant could not in 
good conscience retain the benefit equates with the 
third limb of the remedial constructive trust, 
namely that there must be no juristic reason for the 
enrichment. Furthermore, in both jurisdictions the 
courts have removed the requirement of a fiduciary 
relationship. This accords with restitutionary 
principles, where the concern is not with the nature 
of the relationship between the parties, but rather 
with remedying the resultant unjust enrichment. 
The Court of Appeal's "good conscience" constructive 
trust does, however, differ in two important 
respects from the remedial constructive trust. 
First, the remedial constructive trust is a 
proprietary remedy and confers a beneficial interest 
on the plaintiff with respect to the property held 
by the defendant. In contrast, the "good conscience" 
constructive trust only gives the plaintiff a 
personal remedy, holding the defendant liable to 
account for the value of the property. 
Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, the "good 
conscience" constructive trust is a substantive 
claim in itself, whereas the remedial constructive 
trust is merely one of the remedies available 
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for unjust enrichment. Canadian courts have a 
two-step approach to the cases. Primarily, they 
must find that the defendant has been unjustly 
enriched at the expense of the plaintiff according 
to the formula in Pettkus v Becker.123 Then, and 
only then, can they consider a suitable remedy, 
which is the point at which the remedial constructive 
trust becomes relevant. It is submitted that this 
is more advantageous than the approach taken by the 
New Zealand Court of Appeal. If, as in Elders, the 
court's focus is to be on the benefit derived by 
defendants to which they are not entitled, then the 
restitutionary approach adopted in Canada would 
provide New Zealand courts with the flexibility to 
grant plaintiffs an appropriate remedy. At present 
this flexibility is not permitted by the substantive 
constructive trust. 
7 CONCLUSION 
7.1 The Future for New Zealand 
In the writer's opinion, New Zealand should move 
away from the English substantive constructive trust 
concept of "knowing receipt" towards the remedial 
constructive trust developed in Canada. The New 
Zealand Court of Appeal has already indicated in 
Elders its willingness to use the constructive 
trust as a general equitable remedy. However, the 
"good conscience" constructive trust developed in 
that case is still too restrictive. Restitutionary 
principles require courts to find appropriate 
1231\bove n93. 
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remedies in cases of unjust enrichment. This can 
only be achieved if New Zealand adopts the two stage 
approach now accepted in Canada. 
The "knowing assistance" limb of constructive 
trusteeship should continue to be available in cases 
where defendants no longer have the trust property 
or its traceable product in their hands. Otherwise, 
where defendants retain the property, two actions 
should be available to prospective plaintiffs. 
First, if they have a "pure" proprietary interest 
in the property they should be able to follow it 
into the defendant's hands pursuant to a common law 
or equitable tracing claim. Alternatively, the 
remedial constructive trust should be available as 
a remedy for plaintiffs who do not have a "pure" 
proprietary interest in property, but who claim 
that they have been unjustly deprived of a benefit 
to which they are entitled. 
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